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common law is, of course, indisputable. But likewise it should 
be added that appellant county's maintenance of the present 
action is not inconsistent with this settled principle, sinc.e in 
our opinion its action based upon the reimbursement theory 
is expressly authorized by section 2576 of the Welfare and 
Institutions Code, as above construed. The fallacy of respon-
dent's argument is her assumption that sections 2576-2578 
contemplate not two types of action, but only one method of 
procedure, the filing of a petition for and the securing of a 
court order judicially declaring the responsibility of the 
specified kindred as a prerequisite to the county's commence-
ment of a suit for the recovery of money expended in aid of 
the indigent relation. The fact that respondent as defendant 
in the county's action for reimbursement was furnished with 
notice of suit and afforded an opportunity to present her case 
in court satisfies the requirements of due process of law. This 
precise point was recently so determined in the E~tate of 
Stobie, 30 Cal. App. (2d) 525, 529-530 [86 Pac. (2d) 883], 
wherein the state was suing for reimbursement for the care 
furnished an insane person under a statute making the estate 
of the incompetent liable. 
Furthermore, with respect to the estate's liability upon 
the county's claim, it should be noted that section 573 of the 
Probate Code specifically provides for the survival of an 
action such· as the instant one, which "might have been main-
tained" against the deceased during her lifetime. 
For the reasons above expressed it is our opinion that the 
county's amended complaint herein states a cause of action 
under the provisions of section 2576 of the Welfare and Insti-
tutions Code. Accordingly, the judgment from which this 
appeal was taken is reversed, with directions to the trial court 
to overrule the demurrer and permit the respondent to 
answer if she so desire. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Houser, J., and Carter, J., con-
curred. 
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MYRTLE NEEL, Appellant, v. MANNINGS, INC. (a Cor-
poration), Respondent. ' 
[1] Judgments-Form and Requisites--Oonformity to Pleadings, 
etc.-Judgment Non Obstante Veredicto-Exercise of Power. 
-Inasmuch as the power to set aside a verdict and enter a 
contrary judgment is the same as the power to grant a non- ' 
suit, a motion for judgment notwithstanding a verdict may be 
granted when, and only when, disregarding conflicting evi-
dence,and giving to plaintiff's evidence all the value to which 
it is legally entitled, indulging in every legitimate inference, 
the result is a determination that there is no evidence of"suffi-
cient substantiality to support a verdict in favor of the plain-
tiff. 
[2a-2c] Negligence-Actions-Evidence - Weight and Sufficiency 
-Stairway-Judgment Notwithstanding Verdict.-In an action 
for head injury sustained by a customer as the result of strik-
ing a ceiling board while ascending a stairway, it was error 
to render a judgment for the defendant notwithstanding a ver-
dict for the plaintiff where from the testimony as to the con-
struction of the stairway and as to good architectural prac-
tice requiring projecting handrails the full length of the stair-
way, the jury might reasonably have inferred that the injury 
resulted from the unsafe condition of the stnirway, where the 
jury viewed the premises and the knowledge gained may have 
had much to do with their determination of the issue, and 
where the plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence 
as a matter of law. 
[3] Id.-Oare Toward Particular Persons-Invitees - Duty To-
ward.-The law imposes upon a storekeeper the duty of exer· .. 
cising ordinary care and prudence to keep the aisles and pas-
sageways of the premises, in and through which by their loca-
McK. Dig. References: [lJ Judgments, § 113 (1); [2] Negli-
gence, § 146; [3] Negligence,§ 73; [4] Evidence, § 459; [5] Trial, 
§ 63; [6, 8] Negligence, § 25; [7] Negligence, § 24; [9] Negligence, 
§ 44 (3); [10] Negligence, § 170. 
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cation and arrangement a customer in making purchases' is in-
duced to go, in a reasonably safe condition so as not unneces-
sarily to expose him to danger or accident. 
[4] Evidence-Opinion Evidence-Weight-Expert Opinion.-Ex-
pert evidence is to be given the weight to which it appears 
in each case to be justly"entitled, and the law makes no dis-
tinction between that kind of testimony and evidence of other 
character. The province of such opinion testimony is only to 
aid in coming to a conclusion, and it does not exclude con-
sideration of other evidence which is pertinent to the issue 
involved. 
[5] Trial-Custody, etc., of Jury - View - As Evidence.-The 
knowledge gained by a jury on a view of the premises is in-
dependent evidence in the case. 
[6] Negligence-Exercise of Care-Knowledge of Danger-Con-
structive N otice.-Where the construction of a stairway on 
demised premises has remained unchanged during the ten-year 
period of a tenant's o'ccupancy, he is deemed to have construc-
tive notice of its condition. 
[7] ld.-Exercise of Care-Usage or Custom.-The construction 
of premises in conformity with the generally approved stand-
ard and usual building plan will not exonerate a defendant 
unless such practice or custom was consistent with due care. 
[8] ld.-Exercise of Care-Knowledge of Danger-Ignorance of 
Previous Accident.-The fact that a lessee had no knowledge 
of any like accident having previously occurred on the prem-
ises does not repel a suggestion of negligence and preclude 
inquiry as to whether it had performed its legal duty to main-
tain the premises in a reasonably safe condition for the use 
of patrons. 
(9] ld.-Contributory Negligence-Forgetfulness of Known Dan-
ger.-Although an alleged defect in the construction of prem-
ises may have been patent and observable to anyone using 
them, it was nevertheless a question for the jury whether it 
was a want of ordinary. care not· to have kept in mind such 
element of danger. Even forgetfulness of a known danger will 
not operate to prevent a recovery, for to forget is not negli-
[4J See 10 Cal. Jur. 971, 974. 
[5J See 24 Cal. Jur. 752., 
[6] Constructive notice of defective condition of leased prem-
ises, note, 25 A. L. R. 1295. 
[7] See 19 Oal. Jur. 581. 
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genceunless it shows a want of ordinary care. Generally the 
question is for the ,jury. 
[10] ld.-Trial-Quostions of Law and Fact-Contributory Negli-
gcnce.-In an action for injury sustained by a restaurant cus-
tomerwho struck her head against a ceiling board while 
ascending a stairway, it was for the jury to determine from 
the evidence before it whether it could reasonably be said 
that the natural sway of plaintiff's body as her weight shifted 
in moving on the stairway was sufficient to bring her in line 
to strike her head on the edge of the ceiling bordering the 
stairwell. 
APPEAL from a' judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Harry R. Archbald, Judge. Reversed with directions. 
Action for damages for personal injuries. Judgment for 
the defendant notwithstanding a verdict for the plaintiff 
reversed with directions. 
G. Revelle Harrison and AlbeIt E. Wheatcroft for Appel-lant. 
Sidney .A.. Moss for Respondent. 
CURTIS, J.-This is an action for damages for personal 
injuries sustained by the plaintiff when she struck her head 
against a ceiling board while ascending a stairway alleged to 
have been negligently maintained by the defendant Mannings, 
Inc. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in 
the Sum of $1,500. Thereupon the defendant moved for a 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict upon the ground that 
the evidence not only failed to show that defendant was guilty 
of negligence, but established the fact that the plaintiff's 
injuries were the result of contributory negligence. The 
motion was granted and from the judgment entered accord-
ingly for defendant, plaintiff has appealed. 
[1] It appears to be the well-established law of this state 
that the power of the trial court to set aside a verdict and 
enter a contrary judgment is absolutely the same as its power 
to grant a nonsuit. (Sec. 629, CodeCiv. Proc.; Card v. Boms, 
210 Cal. 200 [291 Pac. 190] ; Hunt v. United Bank & Trust 
Co. of California, 210 Cal. 108 [291 Pac. 184]; 7 Cal. Jur. 
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la-Yr. Supp. 268, sec. 65c.) Therefore, a motion for judg-
ment non obstante veredicto may properly he granted "when, 
and only when, disregarding conflicting evidence, and giving to 
plaintiff's evidence all the value to which it is legally entitled, 
indulging in every legitimate inference which may be drawn 
from that evidence, the result is a determination that there 
is no evidence of sufficient substantiality to support a verdict 
in favor of the plaintiff." (Card v. Roms, supra, at p. 202.) 
[2a] In the light of this settled legal principle an examination 
of the record in this case impels the conclusion that the trial 
court was in error in determining that there was no evidence 
which gave substantial support to the verdict rendered by 
the jury. 
The essential facts basis of the plaintiff's claim are briefly 
as follows: For about ten years prior to May 2, 1939, the 
date of plaintiff's accident, defendant Mannings, Inc., had 
conducted a restaurant on the balcony of the Grand, Central 
Public Market in Los Angeles. As the only public means of 
access to this restaurant defendant maintained a stairway 
of 14 steps, each approximately 714 inches high and 101;2 
inches deep. The stairway was 44 inches wide and extended 
from the ground floor of the market to the floor level of the 
balcony. On each side of the lower half of the stairway was 
a wall rail or banister approximately 30 inches above the 
steps. As the stairs approached the level of the ceiling, the 
open space between the ceiling and each wall rail became nar-
rower. The ceiling did not extend over the stairwell except 
at the bottom of the stairway, but it did extend over the wall 
rails to each 'edge of the stairwell. The upper half of the 
stairway was bordered on each side by solid walls, from which 
handrails projected into the stairwell. From the lower part 
of the stairway, because of the open space on either side 
thereof, there could be seen various stalls located on the floor 
of the market. ' 
At about noon on the day in question plaintiff and her 
friend started abreast up the stairway for the purpose of 
purchasing luncheon at' defendant '8 restaurant. After hav-
ing so ascended a couple of steps and because of the presence 
of other persons on the stairway, plaintiff's companion ad-
vanced to the left and ahead of plaintiff. The two ladies 
proceeded in this position to mount the stairs until plaintiff 
reached the fourth or fifth step, when plaintiff, who was then 
about five or six inches from the wall' rail on the left side, 
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moved further to the left to permit several people who were 
descending the stairs to pass. At the same time she stepped 
upward and struck her head on a sharp board on the edge of 
the ceiling bordering the stairwell, thereby sustaining serious 
injuries. 
Plaintiff testified that she had used the' same stairway on 
other occasions for a period of about fifteen years, during 
none of which times she had struck her head against the 
ceiling in question; that her eyesight was, good; that immedi-
ately prior to the happening of the accident she was looking 
straight ahead as she moved up the stairs, and that when she 
struck her head on the ceiling board upon stepping to the left 
to allow other people coming toward her to pass, she grabbed 
the skirt of her friend, who was walking just ahead and who 
thereupon turned to assist plaintiff in her misfortune. Plain-
tiff's testimony as to the condition of the stairway with re-
spect to the presence of other persons thereon and her action 
following her injury was corroborated by plaintiff's friend, 
who further stated that plaintiff complained that she had hit 
her head and was in considerable pain. A qualified architect, 
called as a witness by defendant, testified with reference to 
approved, building standards for structures of the type in 
question as follows: ' 'In my opinion these steps and stair-
way and that balcony with respect to its position to the 
stairway were scientifically constructed. This stairway and 
its surroundings are constructed in the manner approved 
generally in the County of Los Angeles. In my opinion, this 
construction of the stairway and the railing and the sur-
rounding conditions are built in accordance with sound archi-
tectural practice. It is built in accord with the standard of 
generally approved stairs of this type .... In a construction 
such as involved in this case, where the edge of the ceiling is 
on the same plane with the well' of the stairs or rail, if one 
wished to operate a restaurant on that balcony to accommo-
date from, three to five hundred people I would not neces-
sarily recommend that a rail projecting from the side of the 
well be carried the full length of the stairway, but I would 
so recommend on the basis of good architectural practice .... 
I would recommend that the projecting rail be carried the 
full 1ength of the stairway merely as a continuous line of the 
rail and not in order to prevent people from bumping their 
heads in walking up." During the course of the trial plain-
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tiff moved that the jury visit the scene of the accident and 
examine the stairway; and accordingly this was done. In con-
nection with this inspection it was stipulated by the parties 
that complete measurements as to dimensional facts and floor'-
plan arrangement of the stairway were correctly represented 
by appropriate exhibits introduced in evidence,consisting of 
several pictures and a diagram. There was also testimony 
that defendant had no knowledge of any previous accident 
having occurred on the stairway, and that about three or 
four hundred people daily patronized its restaurant· on the 
balcony. 
[3] It should be noted at this point that there was no ques-
tion before the jury as to the legal relationship existing between 
the parties, for the defendant admitted in its answer that 
plaintiff entered upon its premises as an invitee. The long-
recognized rule governing such status is succinctly stated in 
Brinkworth v. Sam Seelig Co., 51 Cal. App. 668, 670 [197 
Pac. 427]: "One who, during business hours, lawfully enters 
a store to purchase goods does so at the implied invitation of 
the owner (Herzog v. Hemph~'ll, 7 Cal. App. 116 [93 Pac. 
899]), upon whom the law imposes the duty of exercising 
ordinary care and prudence to keep the aisles and passage-
ways of the. premises, in and through which by their location 
and arrangement a customer in making purchases is induced 
to go, in a reasonably safe condition so as to not unnecessarily 
expose him to danger or accident. (Hart v. Grennell, 122 
N. Y. 371 [25 N. E. 354] ; Schmidt v. Bauer, 80 Cal. 565 [5 
L. R. A. 580, 22 Pac. 256] ; Means v. Southern Cal. Ry. Co., 
144 Cal. 473 [1 Ann. Cas. 206, 77 Pac. 1001].)" 
[2b] Under this condition of the evidence the questions pre-
sented to the jury for determination were: (1) whether de-
.fendant was negligent by reason of the manner in· which 
it maintained the stairway; and if so, (2) whether its negli-
genco was the proximate cause of plaintiff's accident. The 
jury's findings upon these questions entailed consideration 
of the following matters: (3) whether plaintiff was negli-
gent; and if so, (4) whether her negligence contributed to 
her injuries. In deciding these issues, the jury was privileged 
to consider the defendant's legal obligation to an invitee upon 
its premises. That there was substantial evidence to support 
the verdict in this case is apparent from the foregoing recital 
of the record, when viewed in the light· most favorable to 
plaintiff and without regard for any asserted contradictions 
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in the proof, as the rule requires the court to do in determin-
ing the ·propriety of a judgment non obstante veredicto. 
Clearly tendered by the pleadings in this case and the basis· 
of plaintiff's charge of negligence against defendant was the 
issue as to the dangerous and defective condition of the stairs 
leading to the restaurant on the balcony. Bearing upon this 
question at the trial was the following evidence: the testi-
mony of plaintiff and her companion as to the general phys-
ical aspect of the stairway and their use of it at the time 
of the accident; the pictures and diagram showing the di-
mensional facts with respect to the steps and the surrounding 
premises, and revealing that the edge of the ceiling was on 
the same line or plane as the inside edge of each of the wall 
rails located on the lower half of the stairway; and the state-
ment of the architect (on cross-examination) that goodarchi-
tedural practice would require a full-length projecting hand-
rail on each side of the stairway. From these evidentiary 
factors the jury might reasonably have inferred that the 
plaintiff, in ascending the steps in the manner presumably 
contemplated by the defendant, was injured by reason of an 
unsafe condition associated with the stairway, such as the 
absence of a continuous projecting handrail along the entire 
length of each side of the staircase to keep a patron's body 
clear of the wall rails and edge of the ceiling, or the presence 
of the wall rails on the lower portion of the stairway inviting 
a customer to assume a position close to the side of the stairs 
in allowing others to pass thereon and thus be apt to strike 
the border of the ceiling in progressing on the way to the 
restaurant. Or the jury might have concluded that the de-
fendant in the exercise of reasonable care to eliminate the 
danger of injury as described herein, should have walled in 
each side of the lower half of the stairway as was done on 
the upper part thereof. It is true that the architect stated 
(on direct examination) that the stairway was "scientifically 
constructed" in the generally approved manner and (on re-
direct examination) that his recommendation with respect to 
the desirability of the full-length projecting handrail related 
to "good architectural practice' , in the sense of aesthetic 
considerations of beauty and continuity. of line rather that in 
deference to safety principles. But the jury was privileged 
to reject this testimony as inconsistent with the positive state-
ment elicited in the course of cross-examination of this witness 
and reasonably referable without qualification to the safety' 
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features of the premises whereon plaintiff claimed to have 
suffered injuries, that in the given circumstances he would 
"recommend that a rail projecting from the side of the well 
be carried the full length of the stairway ... on the basis of good 
architectural practice." [4] Expert testimony is to be given 
the weight to which it appears in each case to be justly en-
titled, and the law makes no distinction' between that kind 
of testimony and evidence of other character. The province' 
of such opinion testimony is only to aid in coming to a con-
clusion, and it does not exclude consideration of other evi-
dence which is pertinent to the issue involved. (10 Cal. Jur. 
971, sec. 228; 974, sec. 232 ; State Oompensation Ins. Fund 
v. Industrial Accident Oommission, 195' Cal. 174 [231 Pac. 
996]; Treadwell v. Nickel, 194 Cal. 243 [228 Pac. 25]; 
Rolland v. Porterfield, 183 Cal. 466 [191 Pac. 913].) This 
principle is particularly applicable in the present case when it 
is remembered that the jury made an inspection of the defend-
ant's premises and observed the pitch or grade of the stairway 
in relation to the edge of the ceiling bordering the stairwell, 
the wall rails and handrails in their respective positions, and 
the probability or likelihood of one striking his head in the 
fashion' above described when ascending the steps in an ordi-
nary manner. [5] The knowledge acquired by this visit to the 
scene of the accident, supplementing the information em-
bodied in the above-mentioned exhibits relative to the dimen-
sional facts as to the construction of the stairway, was inde-
pendent evidenc·e in the case, and undoubtedly it had much 
to do with the jury's determination of this issue in accord 
with the plaintiff's claim. (24 Cal. Jur. 752, sec. 34; Etltel 
D. 00. v. Industrial .Ace. Oom., 219 Cal. 699, 704 [28 Pac. 
(2d) 919]; MacPherson v. West Ooast Transit 00., 94 Cal. 
App. 463, 466 [271 Pac. 509]; Vaughan v. Oounty of 
Tulare, 56 Cal. App. 261, 265 [205 Pac. 21].) [2c] Whether the 
stairway as maintained by the defendant was unsafe and dan-
gerous for the use for which it was intended and to which 
it was put was a question peculiarly proper for submission 
to the arbitrament of the jury. (Oles v. Kahn Bros., 81 Cal. 
App. 76, 83 [253 Pac. 158] ; Long v. John Breuner 00., 36 
Cal. App. 630, 634 [172 Pac. 1132].) 
[6] Following its finding that the premises were dangerous 
and unsafe in the respect alleged by plaintiff, the jury was re-
quired to determine whether the defendant was chargeable 
with knowledge of this condition. Although there was no 
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evidence that defendant had actual notiee of the defective 
character of the stairway, the undisputed fact that the con-
struction . of the stairs and the relation of the balcony thereto 
had remained unchanged during the ten-year period of de-
fendant's tenancy was sufficient to constitute constructive 
notice to defendant of the condition found to exist by the 
jury. (Papineau v. Distributors Packing Go., lOCal. App. 
(2d) 558 [52 Pac. (2d) 571] ;1 Boothby v. Town of Yreka Oity, 
117 Cal. App. 643 [4 Pac. (2d) 589]; Note 25 A. L. R. 1295.) 
[7] The testimony of the architect that the stairway was 
constructed in conformity with generally approved standards 
and usual building plans for that type of structure would 
not serve to absolve defendant from the charge of negligence. 
The general practice or custom would not exonerate defendant 
unless such practice or custom was consistent with due care. 
(19 Cal. Jur. 581, sec. 25; Mehollin v. Ysuchiyama, 11 Cal. 
(2d) 53, 57 [77 Pac. (2d) 855]; Robinet v. Hawks, 200 Cal. 
265, 274 [252 Pac. 1045); Perry v. Angelus Hospital Assn., 
172 Cal. 311, 315 [156 Pac. 449}.) [8] Nor did the showing 
that defendant had no knowledge of any like accident having 
previously occurred on the stairway repel the suggestion of 
negligence and preclude inquiry as to Whether it had per-
formed its legal duty to maintain the premises in a reason-
ably safe condition for the Use of its patrons. This circum-
stance does not negative the possibility that many another 
person in ascending the stairs to the restaurant may have 
struck his head against the ceiling as plaintiff claimed she 
did, but because of slight injury and only temporary pain, 
no complaint was made. Furthermore, if this absence of re-
port of prior mishaps had the effect urged by defendant, it 
would furnish a· perfect defens-e, however dangerous and un-
safe the stairway might appear to be, as shown by other 
evidence. (Sander v. Los Angeles By. Gorp., 38 Cal. App. 
222, 230 [175 Pac. 901].) 
[9] The next question to be considered is whether plaintiff 
was as a matter of law guilty of contributory negligence. 
In this regard defendant relies on the rule that where one 
knows a condition to be dangerous and is injured because of 
failure to take heed thereof, such conduct will bar a reCOvery. 
But even though the evidence did establish that the alleged 
defect in the construction of defendant's premises was patent 
and observable to anyone using the stairway, and that ill 
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addition plaintiff by reason of her past visits to the restaur-
ant was familiar with the exiRting condition, there would still 
be the question for the determination of the jury as to whether 
or not it was a want of ordinary care on the part of plaintiff 
not to have kept in mind such element of danger when step-
ping toward the wall rail to allow other persons descending 
the stairs to pass. (Meindersee v. Meyers, 188 Cal. 498, 503 
[205 Pac. 1078]; Oles v. Kahn Bros., 81 Cal. App. 76, 82 
[253 Pac. 158] ; Hayward v. Downer, 65 Cal. App. 450, 451 
[224 Pac. 265].) Even forgetfulness of a known danger will 
not operate to prevent a recovery, for to forget is not negli-
gence unless it shows a want of ordinary care. Generally the 
question is one for the jury ( Gibson v. Coun'ty of Mendocino, 
16 Cal. (2d) 80, 89 [105 Pac. (2d) 105] ; Smith v. Southern 
Pacific Co., 201 Cal. 57, 69-70 [255 Pac. 500] ; Meindersee v. 
Myers, 188 Cal. 498, 503 [205 Pac. 1078] ; Roseberry v. Ed-
ward F. Niehatts & Co., 166 Cal. 481, 483 [137 Pac. 232] ; 
McStay v. Citizens Nat. T. & S. Bank, 5 CaL App. (2d) 595, 
600 [43 Pac. (2d) 560]; Rosella v. Paxinos, 110 Cal. App. 
299, 302 [294 Pac. 39]), and the record in the present case 
demonstrates that it comes well within this settled principle. 
Plaintiff's act in stepping toward the left wall rail to permit 
several persons approaching her from the opposite direction 
to pass diverted her from her normal course of progress up 
the stairs, which line of travel had been five or six inches 
distant from this mentioned banister. In so doing her atten-
tion was distracted by her effort to avoid collision with these 
other people, and she momentarily did not observe or re-
member the dangerous condition incident to the proximity 
of the edge of the ceiling bordering the stairwell. Whether 
plaintiff's action was reasonable and prudent under the cir-
cumstances was for the jury to decide as an issue of fact. 
(Smith v. Southern Pacific Co., supra, and cases there cited 
at pp. 69-70.) As was said in McStay v. Citizens Nat. T. &; 
S. Bank, S1,tpra, at p. 600: "Wh~re different conclusions may 
be reasonably drawn by different minds from the same evi-
dence, the decision must be left to the jury. " 
[10] Defendant's further contention on this phase of the 
case, that the accident would not have happened if plaintiff had 
not protruded her head beyond the space occupied by the 
stairwell and proceeded up the stairs in that position without 
looking, is purely argumentative and has no evidentiary 
foundation in the record. Plaintiff testified that she was posi-
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tive that she was not leaning over to the left, but was standing 
erect when she "stepped up and over to her left and then 
struck her head." Her version of the accident does not 
appear to be inconsistent with the admitted physical facts 
relative to the construction of the stairway, and it was for 
the jury to determine from the evidence before it whether it 
could reasonably be said that the natural sway of plaintiff's 
body as her weight shifted in so moving on the stairs was 
, sufficient to bring her in'line to strike her head on the edge 
of the ceiling bordering the stairwell. (N eilson v. Houle, 200 
Cal. 726, 728 [254 Pac. 891] ; Parker v. Manchester Hotel Co., 
29 Cal. App.(2d) 446, 456 [85 Pac. (2d) 152].) 
Tested by the foregoing considerations, it is manifest that 
the jury, as the basis of its verdict in favor of plaintiff, was 
warranted in concluding that defendant, by reason of its 
maintenance of the stairway in the condition above described, 
breached its legal duty to plaintiff to keep its premises rea-
sonably safe, and that such negligence was the proximate 
cause of plaintiff's injuries. Accordingly, the judgment is 
reversed and the trial court is hereby directed to enter judg-
ment in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $1,500 pursuant 
to the verdict of the jury rendered in this action. 
Shenk, J., Houser, J., and Carter, J., concurred. 
TRAYNOR, J., dissenting.-I dissent. 
To recover damages for negligence the plaintiff must estab~ 
lish that her injuries were caused by the breach of a duty 
owed to her by defendant. ' The occupant of premises open 
to business visitors is not an insurer of a visitor's safety and 
need not eliminate every condition that might conceivably 
cause injury. He is liable only for injuries caused by con-
ditions, of which he knows or should know, that constitute an 
unreasonable risk to visitors, when he fails to give them ade-
quate warning. (Rest. Torts, sec. 343; Prosser, Torts, sec. 79, 
p. 642; 19 Cal. Jur. 618, 622; 8 Cal. Jur. Supp. 349, 350, 353, 
354, 1011-1012.) , 
In the present case there is not sufficient evidence to sup-
port a finding that the condition of the stairs subjected 
visitors to an unreasonable risk. According to the testimony 
of the architect, the stairs were scientifically constructed in 
the generally approved manner. While he recommended that 
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a hand rail projecting from the side of the well be carried the 
full length of the stairway, he made it clear that this was 
desirable merely to form a continuous line and not to prevent 
people from bumping their heads in walking up the stairs. 
His statement affords no basis for concluding that the stair-
way subjected visitors to unreasonable risk. The fact that 
the jury viewed the premises is not sufficient to support a 
finding of negligence, particularly since the parties stipulated 
that what was viewed by the jury is presented in the exhibits. 
These exhibits picture a normal, unobstructed stairway, and 
contain no evidence· of unreasonable risk to visitors. 
If there is a defective condition in the premises the occu-
pant may discharge his duty to business visitors by giving 
them adequate warning. (Rest. Torts, sec. 343; see cases cited 
in Calif. Annotations to Rest. Torts, sec. 343; Prosser, Torts, 
sec. 19, p. 642; 19 Cal. Jur. 618, 619; 8 Cal. Jur. Supp. 349, 
353, 354, 1011-1017.) If the danger is so apparent that the 
visitor can reasonably be expected to notice it and protect 
himself, the condition itself constitutes adequate warning, and 
the possessor is under no obligation to take further action. 
(Shanley v.American Olive 00., 185 Cal. 552 [197 Pac. 793] ; 
Mautino v. Sutter Hospital 00., 211 Cal. 556 [296 Pac. 76] ; 
Blodgett v. B. H. Dyas 00., 4 Cal. (2d) 511 [50 Pac. (2d) 
801] ; Dingman v. A. F. Mattock 00., 15 Cal. (2d) 622 [104 
Pac. (2d) 26] ; see cases cited in 8 Cal. Jur. Supp. 351, note 4, 
p. 1012, note 4; Prosser, Torts, sec. 79, p. 642.) "There is 
no liability for injuries from the dangers that are obvious, or 
as well known to the person injured as to the owner or occu-
pant." (Mootino v. Sutter Hospital Assn., supra, at p. 561.) 
As stated in Shanley v.American Olive 00., supra, at p. 555: 
, 'The responsibility of such owner for the safety of such per-
son is not absolute; he is only required to use ordinary care 
for the safety of the persons he invites to come upon the 
premises. If there is a danger attending upon such entry, 
or upon the work which the person invited is to do thereon, 
and such danger arises from causes or conditions not readily 
apparent to the eye, it is the duty of the owner to give such 
person reasonable notice or warning of such danger. But 
such owner is entitled to assume that such invitee will per-
ceive that which would be obvious to him upon the ordinary 
use of his own senses. He is not required to give to the invitee 
notice or warning of an obvious danger." 
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In the present case the evidence presented to the jury 
establishes without question that the condition of the stairway 
was apparent to any person using it and was as well known 
to the plaintiff as to the defendant. There is no evidence 
indicating that plaintiff did not have. adequate notice of the 
condition of the stairway, and there is therefore no basis for 
concluding that defendant violated any duty owed to plain-
tiff. The jUdgment of the trial court should be. affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., and Edmonds, J., concurred. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied March 
30, 1942. Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., and Traynor, J., voted 
for a rehearing. 
[L. A. No. 17182. In Bank. Mar. 3, 1942.] 
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[1] Appeal-Judgments and Orders Appealable-Final Judgment 
Where Further Order Necessary.-As to the finality for pur-
poses of appeal of a decree denominated "interlocutory" arid 
directing a further hearing for certain purposes, the substance 
and effect of the adjudication, not its form, are. deter~inative. 
As a general test, which must be adapted to the particular 
circumstances, where no issue is left for· future consideration 
except the fact of compliance or noncompliance with the 
terms of the first decree, the decree is final, but where any-
thing further in the nature of judicial action on the part of 
[1] See 2 Oal. Jur. 137-150. 
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